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Major Developments of The Last Quarter of 2024

OFAC

  • OFAC designated 202 individuals, 608 entities, and named 83 vessels across 14 programs including Counter Narcotics; Counter Terrorism; Global Magnitsky; Cyber; Russia; Election Interference; West Bank; Iran; Sudan; Syria; Balkans-related; Venezuela; North Korea; and Non-Proliferation sanctions program. The most notable actions were taken on November 21st when OFAC designated Gazprombank, SPFS, as well as dozen Russian financial institutions.

  • OFAC announced several enforcement actions including:

    • A $860,000 settlement with Vietnam Beverage Company Limited, a Vietnam-based alcoholic beverage company, who has agreed to settle its subsidiaries' potential civil liability for 43 apparent violations of the North Korea Sanctions Regulations. (Here)

    • A $178,421 settlement with American Life Insurance Company ("ALICO"), a subsidiary of MetLife, Inc. ALICO agreed to settle its potential civil liability for 2,331 apparent violations of OFAC sanctions on Iran. The apparent violations related to insurance policies provided to entities in the United Arab Emirates that were owned or controlled by the Government of Iran. (Here)

    • A $1,104,408 penalty against an individual for 75 violations of OFAC sanctions on Iran. The violations related to the individual's use of an informal value transfer system to remit funds between the United States and Iran in order to purchase, renovate, and operate a hotel in Iran. (Here)

    • A $14,550,000 settlement with Aiotec GmbH ("Aiotec"). Aiotec, a Berlin, Germany-headquartered company that sources industrial equipment for the energy sector, has agreed to settle its potential civil liability for one apparent violation of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR). This apparent violation of the ITSR arose from Aiotec's participation in a conspiracy between 2015 and 2019 to cause a U.S. company to indirectly sell and supply an Australian polypropylene plant to Iran, and remit payments for the sale of the plant through U.S. financial institutions. (Here)

    • A $257,690 settlement with C.H. Robinson International Inc. (CHR). CHR agreed to settle its potential civil liability for 82 apparent violations by five of its non-U.S. subsidiaries, which provided freight brokerage or transportation services for shipments in apparent violation of OFAC sanctions on Cuba and Iran. (Here)

    • A settlement with an individual ("U.S. Person-1"), in which U.S. Person-1 agreed to remit $45,179 to settle their potential civil liability for six apparent violations of OFAC's Global Magnitsky Sanctions Regulations. Between January 2021 and June 2021, U.S. Person-1 executed six payments totaling $45,179 on behalf of a blocked individual with knowledge that the individual was sanctioned; (Here)

    • A settlement with Córdoba Music Group LLC (Córdoba) in which Córdoba, a manufacturer of musical instruments based in California, agreed to remit $41,591 to settle its potential civil liability for apparent violations of sanctions on Iran. On nine occasions, Córdoba shipped instruments and related accessories that it knew were ultimately destined for Iran. (Here)

  • OFAC issued several new or updated general licenses including:

    • Russia-Related General License 13K, Authorizing Certain Administrative Transactions Prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024; (Here)

    • Russia-related General License 8K, "Authorizing Transactions Related to Energy," Russia-related General License 25G, "Authorizing Transactions Related to Telecommunications and Certain Internet-Based Communications," Russia-related General License 110, "Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Certain Entities Blocked on October 30, 2024," Russia-related General License 111, "Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Debt or Equity of, or Derivative Contracts Involving, Certain Entities Blocked on October 30, 2024," and Russia-related General License 112, "Authorizing Civil Aviation Safety and Wind Down Transactions Involving Shaurya Aeronautics Private Limited;" (Here)

    • Russia-related GL 53A, "Authorizing Transactions for Diplomatic Missions of the Russian Federation Involving Gazprombank Joint Stock Company or Prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024," Russia-related GL 55C, "Authorizing Certain Services Related to Sakhalin-2," Russia-related GL 113, "Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Certain Financial Institutions Blocked on November 21, 2024," and Russia-related GL 114, "Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Debt or Equity of, or Derivative Contracts Involving, Certain Entities Blocked on November 21, 2024; (Here)

    • Russia-related General License 1B, "Authorizing Certain Activities Involving Federal State Budgetary Institution Marine Rescue Service," and Russia-related General License 115 "Authorizing Transactions Involving Gazprombank Related to Civil Nuclear Energy;" (Here)

    • Russia-related General License 116, "Authorizing Transactions Involving Entities Owned by Bidzina Ivanishvili;" (Here)

  • The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, issued a determination that identified the petroleum and petrochemical sectors of the Iranian economy pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of Executive Order 13902, which allows Treasury to target a broader range of activities relating to Iran’s trade in petroleum and petrochemical products. (Here)

  • OFAC published the third video in its "OFAC Basics" video series, "Applying for a License to Release Blocked Funds." This video provides viewers with guidance and the recommended steps for how to submit a specific license application for the release of blocked funds. In addition, OFAC has updated the OFAC Licensing landing page as part of its ongoing modernization effort. In addition to improving the user experience, OFAC issued best practices on applying for a license and a case status guide for specific license application status checks. (Here)

  • OFAC has issued an updated Maritime Oil Industry Advisory for both government and private sector actors involved in the global maritime industry which now include recommendations concerning specific best practices. (Here)

  • OFAC issued an OFAC Compliance Communiqué: Sanctions Compliance Guidance for the Maritime Shipping Industry to aid maritime sector stakeholders in identifying certain new or common fact patterns that may be indicative of sanctions evasion, addressing common counterparty due diligence issues, and implementing best practices to promote sanctions compliance.

  • OFAC amended the Burma Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 525, to further implement E.O. 14014 and reissuing them in their entirety. (Here)

  • OFAC published a new, Russia-related Alert, "Sanctions Risk for Foreign Financial Institutions that Join Russian Financial Messaging System, System for Transfer of Financial Messages." (Here)

  • OFAC adopted a final rule amending multiple CFR parts to update general licenses authorizing payments for legal services from funds originating outside the United States. Specifically, OFAC replaced the reporting requirement in the general license with a recordkeeping requirement in applicable parts of 31 CFR chapter V. (Here)

  • OFAC published several FAQs, including:

    • FAQ 1193, FAQ 1194, and FAQ 1195, which discuss the scope of IT services ban;

    • FAQ 1197, which discusses a securities-related question;

    • FAQ 1201, FAQ 1202, FAQ 976, FAQ 1096, FAQ 1197, which came out when OFAC designated Gazprombank on November 21; (Here)

    • Several FAQs related to insurance; (Here)

    • FAQ 894 and FAQ 1203; and

    • FAQ 1204.


OFSI and OTSI

  • OFSI imposed several asset-freezing sanctions, including:

    • 5 ships and 2 entities involved in the Russian Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) sector; (Here)

    • 16 members of prolific Russian cyber-crime gang Evil Corp; (Here)

    • Russia’s Radiological Chemical and Biological Defence troops and their commander; (Here)

    • 9 Iran-related individuals and entities; (Here)

    • 3 illegal settler outposts and 4 organizations that have supported and sponsored violence against communities in the West Bank; (Here)

    • 3 Russian agencies and 3 senior figures who are attempting to undermine and destabilize Ukraine and its democracy; (Here)

    • 6 entities supplying aviation fuel and equipment to the Myanmar military; (Here)

    • 5 new designations under the Central African Republic sanctions regime, 1 new designation under the Chemical Weapons sanctions regime, 2 new designations under the Libya sanctions regime, 1 new designation under the Mali sanctions regime and 46 new designations under the Russia sanctions regime on November 7; (Here)

    • 2 new designations under the Sudan sanctions regime; (Here)

    • Iran Air and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) for aiding Russia in its war in Ukraine; (Here)

    • 10 designations for supporting Vladimir Putin’s attempts to forcibly deport and indoctrinate Ukraine’s children and erase their Ukrainian cultural heritage; (Here)

    • 8 individuals under the Global Anti-Corruption sanctions regime; (Here)

    • 1 individual under the Domestic Terrorism sanctions regime, which was used for the first time; (Here)

    • 6 designations under the Russia sanctions regime as well as a few other designations across various sanctions regimes.

  • OFSI updated several guidance documents throughout the last three months of 2024. You can find all of them on this page.

  • OFSI imposed a monetary penalty of GBP 15,000 on Integral Concierge Services Limited for breaching regulation 12 of The Russia (Sanctions) EU Exit Regulations 2019. (Here)

  • OFSI issued new or updated general licenses, including:

  • OFSI published or amended FAQs related to Russia sanctions. (Here)

  • The UK's Office of Trade Sanctions ("OTSI") started to operate. OTSI published a blog post explaining what OTSI does and here is a link to its homepage.


European Union

  • The EU Council adopted several restrictive measures-related decisions including:

    • Decision to prolong sanctions regime against Sudan for another year; (Here)

    • Decision to prolong sanctions regime against ISIL/Da'esh and Al-Qaeda and persons, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them; (Here)

    • Decision to establish a new framework for restrictive measures in response to Russia’s destabilising actions abroad; (Here)

    • Decision to prolong sanctions regime against Nicaragua for another year; (Here)

    • Decision to impose asset-freezing sanctions against seven individuals and seven entities following Iran’s missile and drone transfers to Russia, including Mahan Air and Iran Air; (Here)

    • Decision to prolong its Chemical Weapons sanctions regime for another year; (Here)

    • Decision to impose restrictive measures against five individuals and one entity responsible for actions destabilizing the Republic of Moldova; (Here)

    • Decision to impose restrictive measures against three persons and one entity associated with the Myanmar military junta, and responsible for scam operations based in the country; (Here)

    • Decision to to widen the scope of the EU framework for restrictive measures in view of Iran’s military support to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities in the Middle East and the Red Sea region; (Here)

    • Decision to add three individuals to the list of persons and entities subject to targeted EU restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria; (Here)

    • Decision to prolong and update the list of individuals, entities, and bodies subject to restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses, for another year; (Here)

    • Decision to renew its restrictive measures in view of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) for an additional year; (Here)

    • The 15th package of sanctions against Russia. Among other things, the 15th package imposed asset-freezing sanctions against 54 persons and 30 entities; (Here)

    • Decision to renew the targeted restrictive measures imposed by the EU against those responsible for actions undermining democracy, the rule of law and the peaceful transfer of power in Guatemala for another year; (Here)

    • Decision to impose asset-freezing sanctions against three Haitian individuals in view of the escalating gang violence, unremitting serious human rights abuses committed by the gangs in the country; (Here)

    • Decision to impose asset-freezing sanctions against 26 individuals and 2 entities from Belarus; (Here)

    • Decision to impose asset-freezing sanctions against four individuals, in view of the gravity of the situation in Sudan, where continuous fighting is ongoing between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces. (Here)

    • Decision to impose asset-freezing sanctions against 16 individuals and three entities responsible for Russia’s destabilizing actions abroad; (Here)

  • On November 14, the European Banking Authority ("EBA") published two sets of final Guidelines that, for the first time, set common EU standards on the governance arrangements and the policies, procedures and controls financial institutions should have in place to be able to comply with Union and national restrictive measures. (Here)


BIS

  • In a major development, BIS published guidance for financial institutions containing best practice recommendations for complying with the Export Administration Regulations. (Here, and see this client alert for more information)

  • BIS published a new edition of “Don’t Let This Happen to You!” (Here)

  • BIS issued several enforcement actions including:

    • First Call International Inc. for the submission of a backdated document to make it appear that a transaction complied with the Export Administration Regulations and for exporting military parts without BIS authorization. (Here)

    • Quantum Corporation, a data storage, management, and protection company  to resolve 45 alleged violations of the antiboycott provisions of the Export Administration Regulations. (Here)

    • a civil penalty of $500,000 against GlobalFoundries U.S. Inc., a semiconductor wafer manufacturing company headquartered in Malta, New York, and its subsidiary, GlobalFoundries U.S. 2 LLC for 74 shipments to Entity Listed Chinese firm; (Here)

    • A civil penalty of $3,300,000 against Integra Technologies, Inc. (“Integra”), a radio frequency and microwave power solutions engineering and manufacturing company headquartered in El Segundo, California. The penalty relates to Integra’s shipments to Russia of transistors and related products, which can be used for avionics or radar systems. Integra made a significant number of shipments to Russia, several of which occurred after such products had been designated by the United States, the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom as Common High Priority List items; (Here)

    • A civil penalty of $180,000 against The Indium Corporation of America (Indium), a materials refiner, smelter, manufacturer, and supplier to the global electronics, semiconductor, thin-film, and thermal management markets. The penalty relates to Indium’s shipments to Russia of solder materials used in electronics manufacturing valued at approximately $96,506; (Here)

  • BIS dded 26 entities to the Entity List for activities contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy under the destinations of the People’s Republic of China, Egypt, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates. These additions are related to alleged violations of export controls, involvement in weapons programs of concern, and evasion of U.S. sanctions and export controls on Russia and Iran. (Here)

  • BIS also added 40 foreign entities, as well as 4 addresses, to the Entity List in connection with their support for the Kremlin’s illegal war in Ukraine and tightening restrictions on 49 foreign entities that were already on the Entity List to address their procurement of high-priority U.S.-branded microelectronics and other items on behalf of Russia. These entities were located in the People’s Republic of China, as well as India, Malaysia, Russia, Singapore, Türkiye, Estonia, Finland, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom. BIS also imposed additional restrictions on the export of 9 chemical precursors used to produce riot control agents and chemical weapons used on the battlefield against Ukraine in violation of treaty commitments. (Here)

  • On December 8, BIS dded 8 entities to the Entity List for activities contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy under the destinations of the People’s Republic of China, Burma, and Russia. These Entity List additions are related to enabling human rights violations. (Here)

  • BIS published a final rule imposing new controls on exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) involving six key categories of items – some of which were previously controlled for nuclear nonproliferation reasons – to Pakistan to address diversion concerns. (Here)

  • BIS announced a package of rules designed to further impair the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) capability to produce advanced-node semiconductors that can be used in the next generation of advanced weapon systems and in artificial intelligence (AI) and advanced computing, which have significant military applications. (Here)

  • BIS issued a final rule cementing the procedures it will follow in investigating foreign adversary threats to information and communications technology and services (ICTS) transactions that may harm U.S. national security, pursuant to Executive Order 13873: Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain. (Here)


FinCEN

  • FinCEN identified the virtual currency exchange PM2BTC, a virtual currency exchanger that enabled illicit transactions related to Russia, as being of “primary money laundering concern” pursuant to section 9714(a) of the Combating Russian Money Laundering Act (as amended). The order prohibited certain transmittals of funds involving PM2BTC by any covered financial institution. (Here)

  • The United States announced a massive multi-agency enforcement actions against TB Bank for violations of the Bank Secrecy Act. (FinCEN's press release, DOJ's press release)

  • In a non-sanctions-related action, FinCEN has assessed a $900,000 civil money penalty against Lake Elsinore Hotel and Casino for willful violations of the Bank Secrecy Act and its implementing regulations. (Here)


Multilateral

  • G7 published, for the first time ever, joint guidance for industry on preventing evasion of the export controls and sanctions imposed on Russia. Among other things, the guidance highlights some red flags and best practices to prevent Russian sanctions evasion efforts. (Here)

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